The scenario happens all the time:

Your engineering department has identified a need for more personnel who will work with export-controlled information. Management has approved the hiring, and your Human Resources manager has drafted the job posting.

What could go wrong? Export controls and anti-discrimination laws require employers to navigate an often-overlooked fine line when recruiting and hiring foreign nationals for positions involving export controlled information.


Continue Reading Refresher: How to Comply With U.S. Export Controls and Anti-Discrimination Laws When Recruiting and Hiring Foreign Nationals

At the end of 2019, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) took another step to limit the potential cyber risks posed by telecommunications equipment manufactured by Chinese companies (and potentially Russian
Continue Reading DoD’s Squeeze of Chinese Telecom Equipment Continues

As you probably know, we have been following very closely developments relating to Section 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which prohibits executive agencies from purchasing restricted
Continue Reading The True Impact of the Chinese Telecom Ban on Government Contractors

On September 9, 2019, the U.S. General Services Administration (“GSA”) announced it would be issuing a mass modification (expected sometime this month)[1] requiring all new and existing GSA Multiple Award Schedule (“MAS”) contracts include two new clauses. The new clauses come in response to Section 889 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), and recently implemented FAR provisions, which impose prohibitions relating to the procurement of certain Chinese telecommunications equipment and services (which we have previously discussed here and here). The two clauses to be added to all MAS contracts are:

  • FAR 52.204-25, Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (Aug 2019)
  • GSAR 552.204-70, Representation Regarding Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (Aug 2019)


Continue Reading GSA Implements Restrictions on Certain Chinese-Made Telecommunications Services and Equipment

We recently wrote about the FAR Council’s release of an interim rule implementing restrictions on procurements involving certain Chinese telecommunications hardware manufacturers and service providers, such as Huawei and ZTE. The interim rule creates a new FAR Subpart 4.21, as well as two new contract clauses, FAR 52.204-24 and 52.204-25, which were effective August 13, 2019. These restrictions apply not only to prime contractors, but also to all subcontractors and throughout the supply chain. Concurrent with the release of the FAR interim rule, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) issued a memorandum, laying out DoD procedures to implement the prohibitions contained therein. These procedures apply to contracts, task orders, and delivery orders, including basic ordering agreements (BOAs), orders against BOAs, blanket purchase agreements (BPAs), and calls against BPAs.
Continue Reading Effective Last Month! – DoD’s Implementation of New FAR Prohibitions on Chinese Telecommunications Equipment and Services in Government Contracts

In accordance with Section 889(a)(1)(A) of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 115-232) (the “2019 NDAA”), which required imposition of broad restrictions on procurements involving certain Chinese telecommunications hardware manufacturers such as Huawei Technologies Co. and ZTE Corp within one year, the FAR Council has released an interim rule implementing these restrictions. On August 13, the FAR Council released Federal Acquisition Circular 2019-05 (84 Fed. Reg. 40,216), creating a new FAR Subpart 4.21, as well as two new contract clauses, FAR 52.204-24 and 52.204-25, all of which are effective August 13, 2019. These restrictions apply not only to prime contractors, but also to all subcontractors and throughout the supply chain. Government contractors need to know that these new requirements are effective immediately and that opportunities for waivers are very limited.
Continue Reading Effective Immediately! – FAR Amended to Include Prohibition on Chinese Telecommunications Equipment and Services in Government Contracts

On May 15, 2019, President Trump issued an Executive Order (“EO”) targeting activities of certain foreign telecommunications companies based in hostile countries. Entitled “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” the EO declares a national emergency based on a Presidential finding that “foreign adversaries are increasingly creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications technology and services … in order to commit malicious cyber-enabled actions” rising to the level of “an unusual and extraordinary threat to national security.”[1] As a result, the EO allows the Federal Government, led by the Secretary of Commerce, to bar U.S. companies from doing business with foreign entities it determines are contributing to the threat. For more on this issue, see our Global Trade Law blog posting here
Continue Reading New Executive Order To Further Restrict Business with Huawei and Other Foreign Adversaries Engaged in Cyber Espionage

[Note, this article was originally posted on January 12 to the Global Trade Law Blog and has been updated to reflect recent events.]

President Trump is making moves to renegotiate NAFTA, but has indicated that if negotiations fail, the United States may give notice of its intent to withdraw from the Agreement. Once in office he reiterated his comments from the campaign trail, stating if Mexico and Canada do not agree to a sufficient renegotiation, then he would submit notice under Section 2205 of NAFTA that the U.S. would withdraw from the Agreement. While the President is capable of writing, signing, and sending (or possibly tweeting) such a notification, that notification alone would not have a legal significance because withdrawing from NAFTA, ab initio, is not a power accorded the President.

The Agreement and underlying laws propose a number of paths by which the President may effectuate withdrawal from NAFTA. However, each of those paths require congressional cooperation or an act by Canada or Mexico to which the President may respond. Negotiating (or renegotiating) the Agreement is squarely within President Trump’s authority, though Congress would then need to implement the terms of the new or amended agreement.


Continue Reading The Undoing Project – Why NAFTA Can’t Be Undone, But Can Be Re-Done

By David Gallacher 

Earlier this month, we wrote about a new proposed rule from the Department of Energy imposing new and onerous requirements relating to compliance with the U.S. export control laws. DOE claimed that this proposed rule was modeled on a prior rule included in the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) at DFARS Subpart 204.73 and DFARS 252.204-7008, promulgated originally in 2008 (and discussed here). But be aware that those DFARS rules were recently removed. Kind of. In case you were not paying attention, the DFARS export restrictions were recently moved to DFARS Subpart 225.79 and DFARS 252.225-7048. See 78 Fed. Reg. 36108. So, even though the citations may have changed, the song remains the same.


Continue Reading “The Song Remains the Same” – DFARS Removes and Replaces Restrictions on Export Controls

By John W. Chierichella

On September 8, 2008, we posted a commentary on a newly promulgated interim rule relating to “Export-Controlled Items,” that was finalized in 2010 and is now set forth at DFARS Subpart 204.73 and implemented in principal part by the clause set forth at 52.204-7008. Click here. That rule was relatively straightforward, basically reminding DOD contractors (1) that they were obligated to “comply with all applicable laws and regulations regarding export-controlled items” and (2) that those compliance obligations existed independent of the new DFARS rule and its implementing clause. In reality, while the clause had the capacity to transform an export violation into a breach of contract, with all of the attendant liabilities and risks that attend such breaches, it imposed no new substantive obligations on DOD contractors.


Continue Reading DOE Proposes Highly Burdensome Reporting Obligations With Respect To Export Compliance

By: David S. Gallacher

2011 was a banner year for U.S. export control laws. The Obama administration has vowed to streamline and reform the bloated U.S. export control system – promising to build "higher walls" around a narrower universe of goods and technologies requiring export licenses. Following is a summary of ten of the key reforms to U.S. export laws that took place (or were proposed) in 2011. 
 


Continue Reading 2011 Year In Review: Export Controls and Promised Reforms